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The  relationship  of  Federal  deficits  and  market 
interest  rates  has  been  the  central  theme  of  much 
recent  discussion  of  economic  policy.  To  many  dis- 
cussants  it  is  axiomatic  that  Federal  deficits  deter- 
mine  interest  rates.  For  example,  as  a bank  chairman 
put  it  “[Deficits]  are  the  major  reason  that  our 
interest  rates  stay  close  to  record  high  levels.” 
(Aunerican  Banker  [5,  p.  Z] )  And  a  trade  group 
asserted,  “More  than  anything  else,  it  is  the  spectre 
of  an  overwhelming  volume  of  deficit  financing  which 
haunts  housing  and  financial  markets.”  (Wall  Street 
Journal  [S,  p.  S]  ) 
Those  and  similar  statements  tend  to  take  the 
asserted  deficit-interest  rate  relationship  as  self- 
evident,  and  thus  do  not  include  theory  or  evidence 
to  support  their  claims.  Yet  a casual  glance  at  recent 
American  data  fails  to  provide  a  clear  contempora- 
neous  link  between  deficits  and  interest  rates.  In  fact, 
Figure  1 indicates  that  in  1975,  when  the  deficit  was 
at  its  highest  level  in  several  decades,  there  were 
neither  high  nor  rising  interest  rates.  While  such 
evidence  does  not  rule  out  any  linkage  of  deficits  and 
interest  rates,  at  the  very  least  the  data  suggest  the 
existence  of  other  important  factors. 
In  order  to  clarify  the  effects  of  deficits,  this  article 
takes  a  closer  look  at  the  theoretical  relation  between 
fiscal  actions  and  interest  rates.  Although  the  analysis 
indicates  that  a  relation  does  exist,  it  also  points  out 
reasons  that  actual  interest  rate  effects  are  likely  to 
be  less  drastic  than  much  of  the  current  discussion 
assumes.  Before  presenting  that  analysis,  however, 
it  is  useful  to  consider  whether  the  reported  Federal 
deficit  is  indeed  a  meaningful  figure. 
Measuring  Federal  Debt 
In  general  terms,  the  Federal  debt  is  the  outstand- 
ing  volume  of  Federal  obligations,  whereas  the  deficit 
is  the  volume  of  expenditures  minus  tax  receipts. 
As  a  matter  of  arithmetic,  the  deficit  (over  an 
interval  of  time)  is  exactly  equal  to  the  sum  of 
changes  in  the  debt  and  the  monetary  base.  Assuming 
for  simplicity  that  there  is  no  change  in  the  monetary 
base,  the  deficit  is  just  the  change  in  the  debt.  Note 
that  the  debt  is  a  fixed  number  at  any  point  in  time, 
and  is  often  referred  to  as  a  stock.  The  deficit,  how- 
ever,  being  the  change  in  a  stock,  is  only  meaningful 
over  an  interval  of  time  and  is  referred  to  as  a  flow. 
The  stock-flow  distinction  is  important  to  keep  in 
mind  in  order  to  appraise  the  size  of  the  debt  or 
deficit  over  time.  Comparisons  of  nominal  magni- 
tudes  over  time  can  be  difficult  to  interpret  due  to 
growth  in  the  price  level,  as  well  as  fluctuations  in 
real  output.  Therefore  ratios  of  nominal  variables  are 
often  used  to  provide  some  perspective.  For  example, 
the  ratio  of  Federal  debt  to  total  debt  compares 
stocks,  while  the  ratio  of  the  deficit  to  private  saving 
compares  flows.  As  Figure  1  indicates,  the  deficit- 
saving  ratio  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1981  was  slightly 
below  20  percent,  compared  to  a  much  larger  33 
percent  in  early  1975.  In  contrast,  the  $100  billion 
deficit  reported  for  late  1981  appears  much  larger 
when  considered  by  itself. 
Once  the  stock-flow  distinction  is  made,  there  are 
further  ambiguities.  Consider  first  the  stock  of 
Federal  debt.  Although  usually  stated  at  par  value 
(that  is,  the  price  when  issued),  market  value  may 
be  more  relevant  to  individuals’  financial  decisions 
and  thus  to  interest  rates.  By  one  estimate  (data  in 
this  paragraph  are  from  the  Council  of  Economic 
Advisers  [ 31)  the  difference  between  market  value 
and  par  value  was  $65  billion  in  1980.  Also,  since 
the  Federal  government  holds  substantial  financial 
assets,  it  may  be  the  case  that  liabilities  minus  assets, 
i.e.,  net  liabilities,  could  be  more  relevant  than  the 
commonly  reported  gross  liabilities.  In  1980,  net 
liabilities  of  the  Federal  government  were  less 
than  half  of  gross  liabilities.  But  those  figures 
ignore  explicit  and  implicit  promises  of  future  Fed- 
eral  spending  that  may  also  affect  the  supplies  of  and 
the  demands  for  financial  assets,  thereby  affecting 
interest  rates.  For  example,  unfunded  social  security 
liabilities  have  been  estimated  at  more  than  $4  trillion, 
not  to  mention  government-guaranteed  loans  and  de- 
posit  insurance  from  Federal  agencies.  Perhaps  the 
present  value  of  these  spending  commitments  should 
be  included  in  the  reported  Federal  debt.  The  prob- 
lem  of  whether  or  not  to  include  them  points  up  the 
lack  of  an  unambiguous  measure  of  the  Federal  debt. 
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And  since  the  Federal  deficit  is  the  change  in  the 
stock  of  Federal  debt  minus  the  change  in  the  mone- 
tary  base,  the  meaning  of  reported  deficits  is  also 
open  to  question. 
Even  assuming  that  the  deficit  is  estimated  without 
ambiguity,  other  problems  remain.  For  one,  the 
deficit  is  often  compared  with  personal  saving  taken 
from  the  National  Income  and  Product  Accounts 
(NIPA).  That  estimate,  however,  is  created  as  a 
residual-personal  income  minus  outlays.  Therefore 
any  error  in  income  or  spending  is  magnified  when 
saving  is  estimated.  For  example,  had  personal  in- 
come  in  1981  been  underestimated  by  1  percent  and 
consumption  estimated  precisely,  there  would  have 
been  an  18  percent  underestimate  of  personal  saving. 
Moreover,  some  analysts  contend  that  saving  minus 
depreciation,  or  net  saving,  is  a  more  relevant  value. 
But  NIPA  depreciation  is  not  a  precise  magnitude 
measuring  actual  transactions,  Instead,  a  large  num- 
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ber  of  assumptions  are  made  in  order  to  use  gross 
investment  data,  which  do  represent  actual  trans- 
actions,  to  estimate  the  magnitudes  of  capital  stocks 
(see  Young  and  Musgrave  [9,  pp.  23-821)  .  Then 
depreciation  patterns  are  also  assumed  and  are  ap- 
plied  to  each  constructed  capital  stock  in  order  to 
estimate  depreciation  flows  over  specific  time  periods. 
Different  assumptions  can  produce  widely  divergent 
estimates  of  capital  stocks  or  depreciation  flows.  Yet 
there  is  little  precise  information  concerning  such 
factors  as  when  and  why  firms  discard  capital  assets, 
or  how  the  productivity  of  various  capital  assets 
changes  over  time,  and  these  are  just  some  of  the 
assumptions  necessary  to  estimate  capital  stocks  and 
depreciation  patterns.  Thus  the  resulting  estimates 
of  depreciation  may  well  be  substantially  different 
from  true  depreciation,  in  turn  making  estimates  of 
net  saving  subject  to  even  greater  measurement  error 
than  gross  saving. 
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ambiguities  involved  in  comparing  the  current  Fed- 
eral  debt  or  deficit  to  historical  values.  That  fact 
alone  should  caution  readers  against  accepting  strong 
claims  unless  proponents  supply  supporting  data  that 
can  be  meaningful  despite  the  measurement  problems 
detailed  above.  The  analysis  in  the  next  section  uses  a 
simple  theoretical  model  that  abstracts  from  such 
complications. 
Traditional  Theory 
A  traditional  macroeconomic  model  is  used  in  this 
section  to  illustrate  why  deficits  could  affect  interest 
rates.  Conventional  models  of  this  type  invariably 
show  that  fiscal  action9  have  a  larger  impact  on 
interest  rates  when  the’economy  is  operating  near  full 
capacity  than  when  substantial  unemployment  exists. 
Thus  in  order  to  illustrate  the  maximum  deficit- 
interest  rate  effect,  a  full  employment  version  of  an 
IS-LM  model  will  be  used  in  this  section  (see  Patin- 
kin  [7,  ch.  121).  This  model  abstracts  from  the 
business  cycle  by  assuming  that  real  output  is  fixed 
(at  full  capacity  j  while  prices  are  allowed  to  vary. 
Perhaps  the  easiest  way  to  use  the  model  is  with  a 
graph  such  as  Figure  2a.  The  object  of  using  such 
models  is  to  attempt  to  determine  the  qualitative 
effects  of  shocks  to  the  economy  by  observing  changes 
in  macroeconomic  equilibrium  in  the  graphical  model. 
The  downward  sloping  line  in  the  graph,  labeled  the 
IS  curve,  illustrates  the  combinations  of  the  price 
level  and  the  interest  rate  for  which  the  demand  for 
commodities  is  equal  to  the  full-employment  quantity 
supplied.  The  upward  sloping  LM  curve  illustrates 
the  price-interest  rate  combinations  for  which  the 
demand  for  money  is  equal  to  the  quantity  supplied. 
At  the  point  of  intersection  of  the  two  curves,  demand 
equals  supply  in  both  the  commodity  and  money 
markets;  such  a  point  is  called  a  macroeconomic 
equilibrium. 
The  model  can  be  used  to  illustrate  the  effect  of  a 
higher  deficit.  To  be  more  specific,  assume  that  (1) 
Federal  taxes  are  lowered,  (2)  Federal  spending  does 
not  change,  (3)  the  tax  cut  was  not  anticipated,  (4) 
no  further  change  in  fiscal  policy  is  anticipated,  (5) 
the  quantity  of  money  does  not  change,  and  (6)  the 
quantity  of  money  is  not  anticipated  to  change  in  the 
future.  (These  assumptions  isolate  purely  fiscal 
1 This  article  abstracts  from  a  persistent  problem,  namely 
the  best  single  magnitude  to  describe  a  fiscal  action.  The 
deficit  is  mentioned  throughout  the  article  because  of  its 
prominence  in  current  policy  discussion.  It  can  he  a 
misleading  indicator  of  fiscal  policy,  however  (see  Blinder 
and  Solow  [Z,  pp.  11-331). 
effects,  avoiding  monetary  and  expectational  effects.)  2 
The  tax  cut  allows  higher  .private  spending  ;  with 
government  spending  fixed,  the  result  is  a  rightward 
shift  in  the  IS  curve  in  Figure  2a.  Accordingly,  the 
new  equilibrium  is  characterized  by  a  higher  price 
level3  and  a higher  interest  rate. 
Interest  Rates  in  an  Open  Economy 
One  reason  for  believing  that  the  model  given 
above  may  overstate  the  importance  of  fiscal  actions 
is  that  the  American  economy  is  but  one  element 
(albeit  an  important  element)  in  a much  larger  world 
economy  with  well-integrated  financial  markets. 
Consequently,  it  is  useful  to  think  of  a  single  world 
interest  rate  which  equates  supply  and  demand  for 
the  total  stock  of  private  and  public  debt  in  the 
world  economy.  That  world  rate  would  be  unaffected 
by  fiscal  actions  in  a  small,  open  economy.  To  see 
this,  imagine  that  after  a  tax  cut  the  domestic  rate  in 
such  a  small  economy  were  to  rise  above  the  world 
rate.  Then  domestic  borrowers  could  borrow  more 
cheaply  in  other  markets,  thereby  lowering  domestic 
credit  demand.  Similarly,  foreign  lenders  could  do 
better  by  lending  in  domestic  markets,  consequently 
increasing  credit  supply.  These  actions  would  tend 
to  eliminate  any  divergence  of  foreign  and  domestic 
rates  in  the  small  economy.  Due  to  its  size,  however, 
American  fiscal  actions  can  alter  the  nominal  supplies 
and  demands  for  debt  enough  to  alter  the  world 
interest  rate.  Nonetheless  a  deficit  of  a given  magni- 
tude  represents  a  smaller  percentage  increase  in  the 
stock  of  world  debt  than  in  the  stock  of  American 
debt.  Accordingly,  it  affects  interest  rates  by  a  lesser 
amount  than  would  be  projected  for  only  the  domestic 
economy. 
A  well-known  analysis  of  the  impact  of  fiscal  ac- 
tions  in  an  open  economy  with  flexible  exchange  rates 
was  given  by  Mundell  [6].  An  adaptation  of  his  anal- 
ysis  in  Figure  2,  shows  the  initial  impact  of  a  fiscal 
expansion  to  be  a  rightward  shift  of  the  IS  curve, 
resulting  in  a  higher  domestic  interest  rate  and  price 
2 By  assuming  no  actual  or  anticipated  money  growth, 
the  possibility  of  an  anticipated,  sustained  inflation  is  also 
assumed  away.  That  is,  while  a  wide  range  of  factors 
may  cause  one-time  movements  of  the  price  level,  as  a 
practical  matter  a  sustained  increase  in  the  money  supply 
is  the  only  source  of  price  increases  in  the  economy  that 
is  capable  of  a  continual,  rapid  increase  over  a  lengthy 
interval;  accordingly,  in  the  long  run  inflation  is  a  mone- 
tary  phenomenon.  By  omitting  inflation,  the  model  is 
simplified.  But  the  omission  of  inflation  also  limits  the 
model’s  current  relevance. 
3 This  analysis  follows  tradition  by  assuming  that  Federal 
taxes  are  lump-sum  taxes.  As  a  result,  substitution  effects 
of  a  tax  change  on  the  price  level  are  not  considered. 
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The  rightward  shift  from  IS,  to  IS,  occurs  due  to  a  tax  cut,  as  described  in  the  text.  As  a  result,  the  equilibrium  values  of  the  interest 
rate  and  price  level  also  change  as  the  economy  moves  from  point  A  to  point  B.  The  leftward  shift  from  IS,  to  IS3  could  occur  if  (1) 
government  bonds  are  only  partially  perceived  to  be  net  wealth,  or  (2)  the  model  represents  a  large,  open  econbmy. 
level.  Assuming  no  immediate  price  change  by  for- 
eign  economies,  a  higher  domestic  price  level  would 
dampen  exports  while  spurring  imports.  At  the  same 
time,  foreigners  would  be  more  willing  to  purchase 
domestic  bonds  due  to  the  interest  rate  differential. 
All  in  all,  the  move  toward  lower  net  exports  would 
result  in  a  leftward  shift  in  the  IS  curve.  The  ulti- 
mate  effect  would  be  for  the  IS  curve  to  shift  back  to 
its  original  position  for  a  small  economy.  For  a  large 
economy,  however,  the  leftward  shift  would  not  be 
complete  to  the  extent  that  the  increase  in  debt  of  the 
large  economy  raised  the  world’s  supply  of  debt  and 
thus  the  interest  rate. 
Deficits  and  Consumer  Behavior 
It  is  also  possible  for  consumer  behavior  to  offset 
some  or  all  of  the  impact  of  a  fiscal  action  (see,  for 
example,  Barro  [ 1,  pp.  1095-l  1181).  The  basic  idea 
is  that  consumption  is  based  on  consumers’  perma- 
nent  disposable  income-which  can  be  reduced  either 
by  current  taxes  or  by  future  taxes.  That  is,  when 
the  government  sells  a  bond,  its  buyer  evidently 
believes  that  the  present  value  of  future  interest 
payments  and  eventual  principal  repayment  is  at 
least  as  large  as  the  current  price  of  the  bond. 
But  if  future  debt  service  payment  will  be  gener- 
ated  by  future  taxes,  then  (in  a  suitably  simplified 
world)  the  present  value  of  additional  future  tax 
obligations  would  be  equal  to  the  current  price  of  a 
government  bond.  Therefore,  financing  a  given 
level  of  government  spending  would  lower  aggre- 
gate  permanent  disposable  income  by  the  same 
amount,  regardless  of  whether  the  spending  were  to 
be  financed  by  current  taxes  or  by  current  debt 
promising  future  taxes.  And  if  aggregate  disposable 
income  did  not  change,  neither  would  aggregate  de- 
mand,  the  price  level,  nor  the  interest  rate. 
Other  Effects  of  Policy  Anticipations 
A  key  assumption  of  the  preceding  section  was  that 
current  deficits  would  lead  to  higher  taxes  in  the 
future.  Another  possibility  is  that  a  higher  deficit 
today  would  generate  growth  in  the  money  supply  in 
the  future  (for  example,  see  McCallum  [4]  ).  Al- 
though  Figure  3  does  not  reveal  a  simple  historical 
relation  between  the  deficit  and  Federal  Reserve 
holdings  of  government  debt,  concerns  about  future 
monetary  actions  should  not  be  summarily  dismissed. 
There  are  historical  examples  in  which  a  government 
reached  a  fiscal  impasse,  caused  by  political  pressure 
groups  inducing  the  government  to  spend  at  a  high 
level  without  collecting  sufficient  taxes  to  avoid  a 
sustained  monetary  acceleration.  That  is  not  to  say 
that  any  single  large  deficit  indicates  that  such  a fiscal 
impasse  is  imminent.  Rather,  attention  should  be 
focused  on  whether  likely  future  deficits  imply  levels 
of  Federal  debt  that  are  consistent  with  monetary 
stability. 
How  a  current  deficit  might  affect  anticipations  of 
future  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  is  thus  a  key  issue. 
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If;  the  Federal  Reserve  were  to  monetize  Federal  deficits,  then  the  Fed’s  holdings  of  government  debt  would  rise  sharply  when  deficits 
increased.  It  is  difficult,  however,  to  see  evidence’of  such  behavior  in  this  graph. 
Most  analyses  based  on  the  IS-LM  framework, 
whether  as  simple  as  the  model  employed  above  or  as 
complex  as  the  major  econometric  models,  evade  the 
question  of  policy  anticipations.  But  modeling  the 
formation  and  evolution  of  policy  anticipations  has 
proved  difficult,  except  for  strongly  restricted  special 
cases.  One  small  step  is  to  include  policy  antici- 
pations  in  the  conventional  model  by  letting  current 
private  bond  demand  be  affected  by  the  perceived  risk 
of  future  inflationary  policy.  Thus  a  policy  that 
would  invalidate  current  anticipations  (such  as  the 
unanticipated  deficit  introduced  above)  could  (1) 
increase  the  perceived  likelihood  of  a  policy  fostering 
higher  inflation  in  the  future,  thereby  (2)  lowering 
current  net  private  bond  demand,  and  consequently 
(3)  raising  the  current  interest  rate  more  than  pre- 
dicted  by  the  simple  model. 
Back-of-the-Envelope  Estimation 
In  the  appendix,  the  responsiveness  of  interest 
rates  ‘to  a  one-time  change  in  the  nominal  value  of 
government  debt  is  shown  (at  least,  within  the  simple 
IS-LM  model  that  ignores  policy  anticipations)  to 
depend  upon  the  responsiveness  of  individuals’  (both 
domestic  and  foreign)  net  demand  for  bonds  with 
respect  to  the  interest  rate  and.the  interest  response 
of  money  demand.  The  specific  expression  is  given 
by  equation  6.  An  interesting  exercise  is  to  use  that 
equation  to  calculate  a  rough  estimate  for  the  change 
in  interest  rates  resulting  from  a  change  in  the  Fed- 
eral  debt.  Under  the  assumption  that  net  bond 
demand  is  somewhat  responsive  to  interest  rates 
while  money  demand  is  slightly  responsive,4  a  1 per- 
cent  change  in  the  stock  of  Federal  debt  would  only 
result  in  a  1 percent  change  in  the  interest  rate.  In 
order  to  get  an  idea  of  the  magnitudes  involved, 
4 More  precisely,  let  the  interest  elasticity  of  net  bond 
demand  be  equal  to  0.95,  and  the  interest  elasticity  of 
money  demand  be  equal  to  -0.05.  The  latter  is  con- 
sistent  with  many  econometric  estimates.  The  interest 
elasticity  of  net  bond  demand  is  not  often  estimated; 
however.  Since  U.  S.  government  debt,  corporate  debt, 
and  foreign  debt  are  close  substitutes,  a  substantial  inter- 
est  elasticity  of  net  bond  demand  appears  reasonable. 
The  exact  parameter  value  is  uncertain,  however,  and 
others  may  not  agree  as  to  what  is  reasonable. 
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stock  of  Federal  debt  is  $1  trillion,  and  the  interest 
rate  is  15  percent  (the  numbers  approximate  recent 
values).  If  the  deficit  were  reduced  to  zero,  the 
upper  limit  would  imply  only  a  150  basis  point  decline 
in  the  interest  rate.  These  calculations  are  only 
illustrative,  however,  in  that  they  ignore  any  effect  of 
changed  anticipations  of  future  policy  and,  in  addi- 
tion,  abstract  from  measurement  problems  connected 
with  the  Federal  debt. 
Conclusion 
Interest  rates  serve  the  purpose  of  equating  the 
supply  of  lending  and  the  demand  for  borrowing. 
Federal  borrowing  demands,  although  important,  are 
only  a  single  element  in  the  supply-demand  frame- 
work,  Thus  it  is  easy  to  overstate  the  responsiveness 
of  interest  rates  to  the  current  Federal  deficit  by 
failing  to  consider  demands  for  and  supplies  of  credit 
by  individuals,  firms,  and  foreign  governments.  Even 
if  the  importance  of  the  current  deficit  is  often  over- 
stated,  however,  it  could  be  important  to  consider  the 
effects  of  current  deficits  on  individuals’  anticipations 
of  future  fiscal  and  monetary  policies. 
Accordingly,  while  simply  reducing  the  current 
leve1  of  the  deficit  would  probably  not  lower  interest 
rates  substantially,  important  policy  considerations 
remain.  For  one,  fiscal  actions  can  affect  incentives 
for  private  sector  borrowing  and  lending  ;  thus  a 
policy  designed  to  lower  credit  demand  and  increase 
supply  could  lower  interest  rates.  Recently  discussed 
examples  include  limiting  the  tax  deductibility  of 
interest  paid,  expanding  opportunities  to  receive  tax- 
free  interest,  and  reducing  Federal  subsidies  for  bor- 
rowing. 
It  is  appropriate  at  this  point  to  consider  antici- 
pations  of  future  policy  actions.  A  major  concern  is 
that  current  and  prospective  fiscal  actions  will  lead 
to  a  monetary  acceleration  in  the  future.  And  to  the 
extent  that  individuals’  anticipations  of  future  money 
tary  policy  include  some  likelihood  that  high  and 
variable  rates  of  inflation  will  be  fostered,  the  supply 
of  long-term  credit  will  be  restricted.  Reducing  that 
Iikelihood  in  private  anticipations  could  be  accom- 
plished  by  a  monetary  rule-that  is,  an  economic 
strategy  to  achieve  low  inflation  that  is  publicly  an- 
nounced  (in  full  detail),  well  understood  by  the  gen- 
eral  public,  credible,  verifiable,  and  perceived  .as being 
difficult  for  policymakers  to  change  or  circumvent 
regardless  of  fiscal  actions.  Such  a  rule  would  break 
any  link  between  current  deficits  and  anticipations  of 
future  monetary  growth  and,  thereby,  c6uld  reduce 
any  risk  premium  in  current  interest  rates  that  re- 
flects  the  probabliity  of  future  inflation.  Since  mone- 
tary  actions  do  not  currently  conform  to  the  require- 
ments  for  a  monetary  rule  listed  above,  it  should  be 
emphasized  that  the  design  and  implementation  of 
such  a rule  would  not  be  a trivial  task.  However,  it  is 
difficult  to  see  any  quicker  way  to  restore  a  high 
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The  purpose  of  this  appendix  is  to  derive  the  elas- 
ticity  of  the  interest  rate  with  respect  to  government 
bond  issue.  There  are  three  markets:  commodity, 
money,  and  bonds.  When  supply  equals  demand  in 
the  money  and  bond  markets,  we  know  by  Walras’ 
Law  that  the  commodity  market  clears.  Market 
clearing  in  the  money  market  is  represented  by 
(1)  $=  L(Y,R) 
where  M  is  the  quantity  of  money  (fixed  by  the 
monetary  authority),  P  is  the  commodity  price  level, 
L  is  the  demand  for  real  money  balances,  Y  is  the 
level  of  real  output,  and  R  is  the  bond  interest  rate. 
The  real  quantity  of  government  bonds  is  repre- 
B 
sented  as  -,  where  B  is  the  number  of  government 
RP 
bonds  (a  bond  is  a  credible  promise  to  pay  $1  per 
year  forever),  R  is  the  rate  of  interest  (consequently 
1 
in  is  the  nominal  price  of  a  bond),  and  thus  z 
R 
is  the  nominal  market  value  of  government  bonds. 
Real  net  demand  for  bonds,  Z,  is  defined  as 
(2)  Z(Y,R)  =  H(Y,R)  -  J(Y,R> 
where  H  is  the  private  real  demand  for  bands  and 
J  is  the  private  real  supply  of  bonds  (the  private 
sector  will  include  foreign  individuals  if  an  inte- 
grated  world  bond  market  is  assumed).  Since 
H,  (=  g)  is  positive  and  JR  is  negative,  Zn  is 
unambiguously  positive.  Market  clearing  is  repre- 
sented  as 
(3)  &  =  Z(Y,R). 
To  look  at  growth  rates,  take  logs  of  (1)  and  (3) 
and  differentiate,  holding  M  and  Y  (at  its  full- 
employment  level)  constant.  Small  letters  will  repre- 
sent  growth  rates  (i.e.,  m  =  $$I,  and  E~,J  is  the 
elasticity  of  I  with  respect  to  J. 
From  (l), 
-p  =  +  LR  dR 
or  (note  k  LR  dR  =  (  F  LE)  $  ) 
(4)  p  =  --EL,Rr. 
From  (3), 
b-r-p=  -$ZEdR  or 
(5)  p=b-  (1  +EZ,R)  r. 
Combining  (4)  and  (5)  yields 
--EL,R  r  =  b  -  (1  +  %R)  r 
and  therefore, 
(6)  - 
1 
ER’B/R  z  b-r  =  E%,~  -  E=,~’ 
Since  this  model  does  not  include  continuing  infla- 
tion,  there  is  no  distinction  between  nominal  and  real 
interest  rates. 
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